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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
MINNIE C. FREHNER dba
FREHNER MOUNTAIN WEST
GARDENS, and LEON C.
FREHNER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
, MARGARET MORTON, D. A.
SKEEN, BERTHA K. SKEEN
and PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 10525

RESPONDENTS AND
CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs sued the defendants for landscape
architect's services and landscape construction performed by plaintiffs for the defendants Margaret
Morton, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen on certain property at Summit Park, Utah, asking that
a lien be determined to exist on the improved property in favor of plaintiffs and praying for foredosure of said lien. Defendants answered denying
liai.'ility, disputing the charges and alleging the
woJ'k was not complete and counter-claimed for
$4,000 for damages to their property. The court in
its pretrial order of November 3, 1965, held that
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under the pleadings as they then appeared the
plaintiffs, upon proper proof, could obtain a personal judgment against D. A. Skeen and Bertha K.
Skeen in addition to foreclosure of a mechanic's
lien. (R-21) In the defendants' statement of the
case they have entirely neglected the aspect of the
personal judgment entered against the defendants
and have proceeded in their brief on the sole question as to whether the claim of plaintiffs is secured by a valid mechanic's lien.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The jury in the trial court brought in a verdict
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants determining that plaintiff Leon Frehner had performed work as a landscape architect for defendants reasonably worth the sum of $156.25, and
that all of said work was secured by a mechanic's
lien; that plaintiff Minnie C. Frehner dba Frehner
Mountain West Gardens had performed work for
defendants of the reasonable value of $1,105.94,
that $808.45 of said work was secured by a mechanic's lien, and that plaintiffs' counsel was entitled to $750.00 attorney's fees. The court had
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the
question of the liability of the defendants, D. A.
Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, for the fair and reasonable value of the labor, materials and professional
services leaving to the jury the question of the
amount. It also directed a verdict determining that
a valid lien existed in favor of plaintiffs against the
property of D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen again

3
leaving the amount of the lien to be determined by
the jury. It also directed a verdict determining the
priority of plaintiffs' lien over the first trust deed
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association
and against defendants, Skeens, on their counterclaim, no cause of action. See trial court's notation
on plaintiffs' requested Instruction #3 (R. 51). At
the hearing on defendants' motion for a new trial,
the court required plaintiffs' counsel to reduce his
attorney's fee from $750.00 to $509.32 (one-half the
total claim supported by a lien.) ( R. 87). Plaintiffs' counsel did so under objection by interlineation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek reversal of the verdict and
the judgment on the verdict, or a new trial. Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the judgment on the verdict
and by cross-appeal seek reinstatement of the attorney's fee awarded by the jury of $750.00 and an
additional attorney's fee for this appeal in the sum
of $500.00.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in defendants' brief entirely omits the facts on which the court found the
agency of Margaret Morton to act for the Skeens
and, therefore, considerable detail is added here.
Defendants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, purchased property at Summit Park, Utah, described
as Lot 48, Summit Park, Plat "C" and prior to construction of any building thereon made arrangements with their daughter, Margaret Morton,
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whereby she might live on the premises with her
two children until such time as the Skeens desired
occupancy or felt to sell (Tr. 243). Margaret Morton desired to be the purchaser at any such sale.
(Tr. 238). The arrangements contemplated that
Margaret would pay the $185.00 per month mortgage payment to Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association (Tr. 244), and that if the Skeens determined to occupy the property or to sell to someone else, and Margaret had built up an equity, she
would be credited with such equity and reimbursed
(Tr. 256).
Margaret had obtained a set of plans from Better Homes and Gardens which were closely followed
in the construction of the home, utilizing a general
contractor, Jess Brewer, of Salt Lake City (Tr. 238).
Margaret was told by defendant, D. A. Skeen, "to
take complete charge and follow the plans," (Tr.
243) as modified by any requests of the general
contractor, which modifications were subject to Mr.
Skeen's approval. Margaret was to be called in to
see "if she would be willing to make the change in
the plans" (Tr. 240). Prior to commencement of
construction, discussion was had between Mr. Skeen
and Mrs. Mqrton regarding landscape gardening
(Tr. 246). Mr. Skeen stated that he attempted to
1diseourage his daughter from dealing with the
plaintiffs since he had had "a very unfortunate
experience with him (Frehner) at one time" (Tr.
246). Margaret, nevertheless, told her father that
"she wanted the job done right and wanted to talk
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with Frehner" (Tr. 248). Margaret went ahead and
made arrangements with the Frehners (Tr. 249)
for detailed studies of the mountain home and the
landscape construction which was to be done by
Mrs. Frehner' s firm "Frehner Mountain West Gardens." Mr. Skeen learned that his daughter had contacted Frehner, (Tr. 248, 249) but did not interfere
with her choice of the landscaper, stating "If that
is your decision, Margaret, I want to have you
happy" (Tr. 248). Skeen agreed that he would provide money for the building and "if the landscaping
is not included in that (the construction loan) I will
have to get the money on the side" (Tr. 249, 262,
263).
Mr. Skeen was on the property on several occasions during construction (Tr. 240) but denied that
he observed the progress of the landscape work
(Tr. 241-A) (Tr. 249). He admitted that he "knew
she was doing something," but had never been on
the ground to inspect it (Tr. 253). He was told by
the general contractor, Brewer, about the time Mr.
Frehner started the job (Tr. 138) that "Frehner
has been up that way, and he is going to make this
cost you three times what it should cost" (Tr. 259).
He also was told by Brewer that the pond "will cost
some money. I don't know how much" (Tr. 259).
Skeen indicated the landscaping was not frequently
discussed in the Skeen home because "Margaret intended to complete the thing and give me a surprise"
(Tr. 260). Brewer had told Skeen "Margaret is
enthusiastic over it, but don't let her know that I
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told this to you" (Tr. 262). Eleanor, another daughter, is represented by Skeen as saying, "I am afraid
that fellow Frehner has imposed upon Margaret
and you have to pay for it" (Tr. 263). Despite all
these "warnings" Mr. Skeen did nothing, not even
voicing an objection (Tr. 138), explaining his inaction by stating that "he recognized how sensitive
Margaret was and didn't want to hurt her feelings
by criticizing her judgment" (Tr. 264). There was
some discussion between Margaret and her father
with reference to her father drawing a written contract for the landscaping. Skeen knew at the time
that Frehners were the landscapers involved (Tr.
264). Such a contract was never prepared and Mr.
Frehner proceeded under the oral arrangement
assuming the property was Margaret's and that she
had the right to order the improvements.
The landscape work was completed in early
December of 1964 and plaintiffs' bills under date
of December 1, 1964, and January 1, 1965 (See plaintiffs' Exhibits #1, #8 and #9) were submitted to
Mrs. Morton. Mr. Brewer received the bills from
Mrs. Morton and presented them to Mr. Skeen who
made no attempt to pay them. It was evident at this
time that the·money had run out and that the construction of the mountain home had far exceeded
the estimates of the parties. The final cost was
"close to $40,000" (Tr. 109). A loan for $22,000
had been taken with Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan which had been increased to $24,200 (Tr. 105)
and Mr. Skeen had determined to pay the balance
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(approximately $15,800) from his own funds (Tr.
117.)
Mr. Skeen stated that he considered his daughter extravagant (Tr. 250, 251) and that he intended, after covering the added expenses incurred
in connection with the construction that Margaret
would pay him back when her situation permitted.
(Tr. 265) The exchange between plaintiff's counsel
and Skeen occurred as follows:

Q (Mr. Swan) Can you establish the approx-

A

imate date of this conversation?
THE COURT: The time you said you
would analyze it. (The contract).
It was before-well, I can't say a definite
date. I think it was when she-I told her
about the time-I told her that if she
wanted to take the responsibility, she
would have to pay the penalty for doing
it, if she went on her own judgment.

Q (Mr. Swan) Now you didn't say that,

A

though, Mr. Skeen. You said that if you
couldn't cover it out of the loan you would
have to get the money elsewhere.
To meet this, but I would expect her to pay
me back. I wasn't making a gift of it.

Q You mean eventually, when her situation
A

permitted, she would reimburse you?
That is right.

After no action had been taken on the payment
of plaintiffs' bills, Mrs. Frehner made an appoint-
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ment for her husband to see Mr. Skeen at his law
office in March, 1965, at which time according to
Mr. Frehner's version, (Tr. 45) Mr. Skeen refused
responsibility for the bill and instructed Mr. Frehner
he would have to look to Margaret for payment. In
Mr. Skeen's version of the conversation, he told Mr.
Frehner that his bill far exceeded a reasonable
amount (Tr. 250) and that he would not pay for
it and also cautioned Mr. Frehner that no effort
should be made to press Margaret for payment since
she might lose her job at the University of Utah.
(Tr. 251, 252) The cross-examination of Skeen on
this conversation is illuminating: (Tr. 272):

Q That was the first time-please respond

to my question-that was the first time
you ever told Mr. Frehner you would not
be bound?
A I have told you that three or four times.

Q Until the presentation of these bills, you
A

did not know what the details of this work
was, I believe was the word you used?
That is right.

Q You knew Frehner landscape gardening
work was going on, on your premises?

A

I wouldn't say the landscaping-the tearing down the hill and doing more damage
than good.

Q Whatever it was, he was doing it?
A

Well, he wouldn't have done it if I had
control of it. I would have thrown him off.
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Q The only reason you didn't, you didn't

want to hurt Margaret?
A Well, I have explained that two or three
times.
Q All right. I will accept your answer.

'The day following the conversation between Mr.
Frehner and Mr. Skeen in Skeen's office a lien was
placed on the Summit Park property and shortly
thereafter proceedings started to foreclose it. Mrs.
Morton was killed August 27, 1965, (Tr. 244) during the pendency of this action and at a pretrial
conference the plaintiffs elected not to proceed
against any possible estate of Mrs. Morton and consented to the dismissal of the action as against her.
The mountain home was traded during the pendency of the action for property as 2067 Pheasant
Circle in Salt Lake County, valued at $45,000 (Tr.
275) Skeen paying to the other party, Arthur Overlade, Jr., the sum of $3,000.00 in cash (Tr. 274).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TYPE OF WORK PERFORMED AND IMPROVEMENTS MADE WERE LIENABLE UNDER THE UTAH CODE.
Title 38-1-3 U. C. A. 1953 gives a lien to "Contractors, sub-contractors, and all persons performing
labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in,
the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or
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repair of, any building, structure, or improvement
upon land.... "
The test that would seem to govern under Utah
law is that stated in the case of King Bros., Inc. vs.
Utah Dry Kiln Company, Inc. 13 U. 2d 339, 374 P.
2d 254, a case involving the application of the Utah
Bond law. The court noted that the bond statute is
closely related in purpose and the language used
therein practically identical to that of the mechanics
lien statute and observed that "the mechanics lien
statutes were designed to prevent the landowner
from taking the benefit of improvements placed on
his property without paying for the labor and materials that went into it." The court sent back for
trial a case that had been dismissed on defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court
for determination to be made whether furnaces,
furnace casings, motorized fans, pipes and hoods
furnished a dry kiln plant were, in fact, covered by
the lien statute. This court gave a guide to the trial
judge by stating:
"The facts must be ascertained so that under
the guidance of applicable principles of law,
the correct determination can be made. In
order to qualify under these statutes, it is necessary that there be an annexation to the land,
or to some permanent structure upon it, so
that the materials in question can properly be
regarded as having become a part of the realty,
or a fixture appurtenant to it, and this must
have been done with the intention of making it
a permanent part thereof. That the addition
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is consistent with the use to which the property is put is often helpful in making the determination.''
In the instant case, the trial court quoted verbatim from this Supreme Court decision in Instruction No. 9c. The jury has determined that part of
the improvements which the Frehners made were
"annexed to the land so that the materials in question might properly be regarded as having become
a part of the realty with the intent of making it a
permanent part thereof." Such determination was
made with respect to the hauling in of top soil,
the sodding of the lawn area and the construction of
a pool and waterfall. These were the major items
of improvement. The jury found that part of the
work performed by Mrs. Frehner was not lienable,
and by reference to the worksheets of Mrs. Frehner
the jury delineated between the items specified
above and the cleaning up, the cutting of firewood
and the hauling of trash.
Defendants cite in their brief the case of Howe
v. Meyers, 162 Pac. 1000 (Wash.). It may be seen
from the footnote at 36 Am. Jur., Mechanic's Liens,
Sec. 66 that the Supreme Court of Washington distinguished the facts in that case which involved the
caring of an orchard from other cases which had sustained liens for "planting a vineyard," "planting
trees, shrubs and flowers," "planting an apple
orchard," or "breaking and reducing wild lands to
cultivation" for the reason that in such cases the
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labor amounts "to a connected and completed operation, while work in cultivating and caring for an
orchard is more or less intermittent, disconnected
and seasonal." Clearly the items found by the jury
in the instant case to be lienable were not intermittent in character but were permanent improvements to the real estate.
The language at 36 Am. Jur., Mechanic's Liens,
Sec. 66 indicates that courts have been divided on
the question of mechanic's liens for filling, grading,
terracing, sodding, fencing, and other like improvements. A great deal depends upon the language used
in the statute. There is respectable authority for
plaintiffs view that the landscape construction in
the instant case was lienable. As stated in 36 Am.
Jur., Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 66, "It has been held
that a lien for terracing and sodding a building lot
is authorized under a statute providing that anyone has a lien who shall perform labor or furnish
materials to be used in altering or repairing 'any
building or building lot including fences, sidewalks,
paving, fountains, fish pond, fruit and ornamental
trees.' " Further, "According to the one view, grading which is reasonably necessary to the proper construction and occupation of a house may fairly be
considered as part of the 'erection' within the
meaning of the statute, and terracing and sodding
as well as grading are within a statute giving a lien
to any person who shall perform labor or service in
altering or repairing any 'building or building lot.'"
The same section goes on to state, "The furnishing
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and planting of trees and shrubs, and the caring
for the same for such a period of time as will insure
that the seeds have become well started and that
the plants and trees were thoroughly settled in the
ground has been held to be an 'improvement' to
the real estate within the meaning of a statute providing that 'any person who at the request of the reputed owner of any lot in any incorporated city or
town, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the
same, has a lien upon said lot for his work done and
materials furnished'."
An annotation on this subject is found at 39 ALR
2d 861 wherein the case of Green vs. Reese, 261 P.
2d 596 (Okla., 1953) is noted. That case held that
"the leveling and building up of certain vacant lots
with tractor, bulldozer, and scraper, for the purpose
of improving the land so that buildings could subsequently be erected thereon," was sufficient to constitute a lienable item under the statute, the court
apparently being of the opinion that such labor came
within the meaning of the word "improvement"
appearing therein.
Likewise in Southwestern Electrical Company
vs. Hughes, 30 P. 2d 114 (Kan., 1934) that court
held that grading around a house and garage were
lienable items.
It would seem that under the broad language of
the Utah code, to-wit; "improvement on land" such
permanent improvements as landscape construction
were clearly within the intent of the legislature.
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POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS D. A.
SKEEN AND BERTHA K. SKEEN ON THE LIABILITY ISSUE.
The defendants seem to have abandoned any argument that the defendants D. A. and Bertha K.
Skeen were not personally liable as directed by the
court for the reasonable value of the improvements
made. Their brief argues only the lien question.
The facts indicate an agency on the part of Mrs.
Morton to proceed with the landscaping of the mountain home. Mr. Skeen knew that Margaret was negotiating for landscaping to be done, he knew that
she had consulted Frehner and, further, Skeen had
agreed to provide the funds necessary to pay for
the landscaping. It is difficult to imagine what
additional authorization Margaret needed to proceed
in behalf of the owners to complete the landscaping.
By their pleadings in this case, the Skeens contended
they knew nothing about the Frehners being on the
property until after the entire landscape construction was completed and bills submitted. They denied
that they gave any authorization for the work to be
done. D. A. Skeen's testimony at the trial established
the contrary. He knew that Margaret was going to
talk to Frehner about the improvements; he wanted
her to be happy in her choice; he did not interefere
because it would amount to criticism of her judgment; he knew she was extravagant but didn't want
to hurt her feelings. It is no wonder that Margaret
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obviously thought she had authorization from her
father to proceed with the landscaping. The Skeens
had it within their power from the commencement
of the landscape construction to contact Frehners
and tell them to get off their property. They made
no contact with the Frehners until after the work
was completed and then the meeting was at the instance of Mrs. Frehner.
It appears in this case that Mr. and Mrs. Frehn-

er thought they were dealing with the agent of an
undisclosed principal. This does not relieve the principal, however, from responsibility for the agent's
contract. Once having determined the identity of
the principal, the plaintiffs had a legal right to
pursue that principal for the reasonable value of the
improvements made. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d., Agency,
Sec. 311.
In defendants' brief so much is made of the
"estoppel and ratification theories" of plaintiffs recovery that defendants have failed to comment on
the reasons for the non-existence of an express or
implied agency. It would seem that even under the
estoppel or ratification theories, plaintiff should
prevail. At 58 ALR 793 appears an annotation entitled "Estoppel-failure to disclose title." At Sec. 35
it is stated:
"It is the general rule in equity that where a
person having rights and knowing those
rights, sees another person take a mortgage
upon property without disclosing his title, he
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shall not be allowed afterwards to set up his
title to defeat the mortgage.
An analogous doctrine is applicable to cases
involving the execution of deeds of trust; to
cases in which a leasehold interest is created,
and to cases in which contracts which may
furnish a basis for claims under the mechanic's lien laws are entered into." (emphasis
added.)
In Donaldson vs. Holmes, 23 Ill. 85 (1859) the
holder of legal title was estopped from asserting it
where he stood by and suffered the purchaser to
enter into a contract for erection of a building, without disclosing the fact that the latter did not own
the lot and had made no payment on it.
At 76 ALR 304 is found an annotation entitled
"Estoppel by apparent acquiescence in or silence
concerning improvements of real property to assert
antagonistic title or interest." It is there stated:

"It is said to be a very familiar rule of the
law of estoppel that if the owner of an estate
stands by and sees another erect improvements
on the estate in the belief that he has a right
to do so, and does not interpose to prevent the
work, he will not be permitted to claim such
improvements after they are erected."
In the case of Burrow vs. Carley, 290 Pac. 577
(Calif., 1930) the court stated, "An owner of property may not stand by and see another erect improvements thereon in the belief that he has title to
or interest in it and remain silent under circum-
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st~nces calling upon him to speak without thereby

bemg estopped from claiming title to the property,
at least without making compensation."

Again quoting from our lien statute, Title 381-3, the lien is given for "the value of the service
rendered, labor performed, or materials furnished
... whether at the instance of the owner or of any
other person acting by his authority as his agent,
contractor, or otherwise." It is submitted that the
authority of such other person should be subject to
proof the same as in non-lien situations; that is, by
showing estoppel, ratification or any other circumstance which would bind the principal. At 36 Am.
Jur., Mechanics Lien, Sec. 39 entitled "Estoppel of
owner or mortgagee as against lien claimant," it is
stated:
"The owner or party liable for the improvement may, on his part, be estopped from asserting a defense against the lien claimant.
Thus, one having rights in the property, who,
with knowledge of those rights sees persons
entering into contracts which may furnish a
basis for claims under the mechanic's lien law
may be estopped to assert such rights."
The cases cited by defendants in their brief can
be distinguished from the facts here. Morrow vs.
Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667 (1898) involved
a landlord-tenant situation in which the trial court
had imposed a lien on the landlord's interest where
he had not contracted for the materials or labor, the
only evidence of authority being a provision in a
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lease that the lessee would expend $2 ,5 00 in the
erection of permanent improvements on the premises. In that case the Supreme Court did not have
facts from which an estoppel or ratification could
be found. In Belnap vs. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 97
Pac. 111 (1903) the court had a vendor-vendee
situation and cited the Morrow vs. Merritt case with
approval. The court stated at page 113 of Pacific:
"From the fore going it would seem that the
person who can bind the owner's land for the
things for which a lien is given must in some
way obtain his authority to do so from the
owner. Without such authority, express or
implied, in the first instance, or subsequent
ratification by the owner, the owner's property is not bound, although the improvements
may benefit his land." (emphasis added).
The Court went on to state at page 114:
"In this connection it is also insisted that the
appellant is not limited by the terms of a
written agreement which may bind the parties
to it only, but that he may show any parol
agreement between Mrs. Condon (vendor)
and Mr. Becker ( vendee) from which the
authority from her to him to purchase materials to improve the property may directly
appear or be inferred. This contention in our
judgment is sound. The real question involved
in such case is to establish the relationship of
principal and agent between the vendor and
purchaser. If, therefore, the person furnishing
material which is purchased for the improvement of certain property can show that the
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purchaser of the material was the agent of
the real owner of the property, the agency
ma¥ be establ~shed in such a case, precisely,
as it may be m any other case. But the evidence in such a case must establish agency.
Without this there can be no authority in the
person purchasing the material to bind the
owner of the property, who is the principal."
In the Belnap case such facts as would constitute
a ratification did not exist. In the present case Mr.
Skeen himself testified that he authorized Margaret
to go ahead with landscaping, that he knew she was
going to contact Frehner, but did nothing to discourage her since it would impute her judgment. He
had full knowledge of the facts when he was informed by Brewer, the general contractor, that
Frehner was on the property making improvements.
His acceptance of those improvements and retention
of benefits constitute a ratification of the agency.
As stated at 3 Am. Jr. 2d. Agency, Sec 175:

"It is an established principle of the law of
agency that where a person acts for another
who accepts or retains the benefits or proceeds
of his efforts with knowledge of the material
facts surrounding the transaction, such other
must be deemed to have ratified the methods
employed, as he may not, even though innocent, receive or retain the benefits of, and at
the same time disclaim responsibility for, the
measures by which they were acquired."
Sec. 178 states regarding acquiescence:
"Whether there has been a ratification in a

'
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particular case is ultimately and ordinarily a
question of fact. Strictly speaking, therefore
a failure to repudiate, or silence or acquies~
cence, after learning of an unauthorized act
and in a case where the principal has an opportunity to repudiate or object to the act, does
not of itself constitute ratification. Yet it is,
if the one purporting to act as agent is not a
mere stranger or intermeddler, cogent or
prima facie evidence from which ratification
may be inferred in the light of surrounding
circumstances."

Morrison vs. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235
( 1899) involved a married woman's interest in real
estate sought to be charged with a lien for improvements contracted solely by her husband. The fact
situation can easily be distinguished from that in the
instant case since in the Morrison case the wife disagreed with her husband about constructing the
house on the lot and wanted it erected on land in
California and objected and protested against the
building of the house on her land; he built the house
against her objection and over her protest, and she
never consented thereto. During all this time, and
up to the completion of the house, she believed he
was, and he was in fact, financially able to pay for
the labor and materials so furnished. In that case
the court at page. 237 of Pacific states that the wife
might ratify the husband's contract or by conniving
to conceal her ownership fraudulently mislead the
contractor into the belief that her husband owns
the land. The Morrison case had no such facts. In the
instant case it can be determined that the failure
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of the Skeens to inform Mr. Frehner that his improvements were not desired on their property
amounted to a concealment of their ownership and
misled Frehner into the belief that Margaret Morton
owned the land.
It is submitted that the instant case is more

nearly like Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos, 6
U. 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517 where this court determined that a lessee's interest in certain property
was subject to a lien for improvements where the
improvements were ordered made by one who was
not the lessee, but an alleged partner of the lessee.
In that case the court had to find a partnership
(agency) which agency was found on the basis of
Glezos consenting to another's representing him to
third parties as a partner and those third parties
had on the faith thereof advanced materials, money
or credit to the partnership. The court stated that
Glezos was liable "even though as between them
(the alleged partners) no real partnership exists."
This was a finding of partnership (agency) by
estoppel. In the instant case Mr. Skeen allowed his
daughter to proceed as though she were authorized
to order the materials and labor which resulted in
improvements to the Skeen property. By inference
he consented to Margaret's representing herself as
having authority to contract for the improvements.
Skeen did, in fact, pay for the construction costs on
the mountain home until the money ran out, at which
time he refused to make payment on the landscape
construction bill. In the instant case an agency
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existed, either express or implied. At
an agency by estoppel or ratification,
subjected the Skeens' interest in the
a lien for improvements for which
directly contract.

the very least
existed which
real estate to
they did not

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' M 0 TI 0 N FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF RESPONDENTS' CASE.
At the close of plaintiffs' case the evidence concerning Mr. Skeen's knowledge of Mr. Frehner's
being upon the premises and of proceeding with
work which Margaret had contracted for was limited to the testimony of the general contractor,
Brewer, who stated that he had talked with Mr.
Skeen shortly after Frehner commenced the landscape work and told him that Frehner was on the
property and that he (Skeen) should be concerned
because he might have to pay more than he should
for the improvements. When Mr. Skeen, took the
stand in his own behalf, he added to this testimony
substantially. It was his own testimony which established the conversations between Margaret and
him on which Margaret's authority to proceed with
this work can be based. It should be remembered
that Margaret was dead at the time of the trial and
it was impossible to introduce any evidence as to
the exact relationship between them except through
Mr. Skeen. It is submitted that there was some evi-
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dence of an agency, or at least an estoppel or ratification, at the close of plaintiffs' case and when
defendant Skeen, took the stand he removed all
doubt.
Where the defendants' motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' case is denied and
defendant thereupon presents his own evidence, the
defendant has been held to have waived any error
in the denial of the motion for directed verdict.
Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada vs. Oliver P. Cummings, 27 L. Ed. 266; see also Newman
vs. Brengle, 250 F. 2d 660 and numerous other
cases annotated at 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 50, Section 15
"Waiver."
CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiffs hereby cross-appeal from the trial
court's order that the attorney's fee as awarded by
the jury be modified downward. Plaintiffs further
ask for an attorney's fee to reimburse them for fees
incurred by them on this appeal.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REDUCING THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDED BY THE JURY.
Testimony of plaintiffs' counsel given on the
second day of a three day trial was to the effect that
a reasonable fee based upon time expended, pleadings drafted, memoranda to the court prepared,
motions and pretrials attended and days in actual
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trial up to that time was the sum of $970.00, but
that in view of the total amount involved in the
controversy counsel felt that he would only ask for
$750.00. Another full day of trial ensued after this
testimony of plaintiffs' counsel. The jury, upon
instruction as to what they might consider in determining the reasonableness of plaintiffs' attorney's
fees (see Instruction No. 9-D) returned a verdict
of $750.00.
On the hearing of defendants' motion for a new
trial and defendants' motion to set aside the verdict
and judgment thereon and for a directed verdict,
the trial court required plaintiff to submit to a reduction of the attorney's fee to one-half of the total
amount of recovery determined as being subject to
a lien. The trial court apparently determined that
under no conditions could an attorney's fee exceed
50 per cent of the claim upon which recovery was
based.
Title 38-1-18 UCA 1953 states as follows:
"In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful parties shall
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in this action.
It may be argued that the matter of attorney's

fees was improperly submitted to the jury in this
case and that it is the sole prerogative of the court
to fix fees. The statute could be interpreted, however, as giving to the "finder of fact" the right to
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fix the attorney's fee, in which case it would properly be a jury function in a jury case. Plaintiffs are
not as much concerned with who fixes the fee as
the general proposition that they are limited to 50
per cent of the recovery.
At the first pretrial hearing counsel actually
stipulated as to what would be reasonable (R. 16)
and agreed on the bar fee schedule (which would be
$311.12 on $1,018.61) plus $150.00 for each day of
trial after the first. Since the trial lasted three full
days the total fee under this formula would be
$611.12. But at a subsequent pretrial the trial court
allowed plaintiffs' counsel to withdraw from the
stipulation (R.30) and framed an issue for trial on
"what is a reasonable attorney's fee." It was apparent to plaintiffs' counsel at this stage of the proceedings that the actual fee which would be incurred
in this trial would far exceed the amount set forth
in the stipulation.
The question of attorney's fees in lien matters
has produced about as many results as there are
cases. What was a reasonable fee in 1950 may not
be reasonable in 1966, due to the reduced buying
power of the dollar. Courts have sought some middle ground in the matter as is evidenced by the following from Davis vs. Altose, 35 Wash. 2d. 807,
215 P. 2d. 705 (1950):
"It is of the utmost importance to litigants
that a reasonable attorney's fee be fixed by the
court which will, as nearly as can be done,
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adequately compensate the lien claimant's
counsel for services necessarily rendered in
the case and at the same time not unduly burden the property owner with the payment
which he must make, in addition to the amount
of the lien in order to discharge his property
from the judgment."
It is submitted that if one element of this formula
should be given greater weight, it would be the adequate compensation of the lien claimant's counsel,
if successful, for his theory of the case has won the
approval of the court or jury. Each party runs the
risk of paying the other party's attorney's fees. The
statute is worded so that if plaintiffs had lost, they
would have been subjected to payment of defendants'
attorney fees.

In Hopkins vs. Ulvestad 46 Wash. 2d. 514, 282
P. 2d. 806 (1955) the trial court awarded $150.00
attorney's fees in an action where $173.70 was recovered. On appeal the lien claim was increased to
$721.28 and the court increased the trial court fee to
$300.00. The Supreme Court refused to fix the
amount of the attorney's fees earned on the appeal,
but indicated that the trial court might do so at any
time.
POINT V
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN
ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR THIS
APPEAL.
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Our statute provides for an attorney's fee "in
any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter." Obviously the judgment of the trial court
cannot result in enforcement of the lien, when, as
here, an appeal is taken and supersedeas bond filed
to prevent execution. The resistance of the appeal,
therefore, in the most real sense, is part of "enforcing the lien.''
Many courts have awarded attorney's fees incurred on appeals in lien cases. See 56 ALR 2d 114.
In Haskett vs. Turner, 290 P. 2d. 133 (Okla., 1955)
the reviewing court awarded an additional attorney's
fee on an appeal of $250.00. In Welfare Federation
Act Committee of 1,000 vs. Richardson, 281 P. 2d.
428 (Okla.) the judgment for an increased fee of
$425.00 on appeal was rendered on the supersedeas
bond. This case was one for wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act but the precedent was followed
in the Haskett case, a lien action previously cited.
In Davis vs. Altose, op. cit., a principal recovery
of $938. 77 was effected and the Supreme Court
ordered a reduction of the attorney's fee from
$800.00 to $650.00. In that case the total allowed by
the trial court was in anticipation of an appeal and
would have been 80 per cent of the total recovery
( $400.00 for the trial and $400.00 for the appeal.)
The appellate court approved a combined fee for the
trial and the appeal totaling 69.2 per cent.
The advisory Handbook on Fees of the Utah
State Bar proposes a fee of $500.00 for representing
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either appellant or respondent in the Supreme Court
of Utah (p. 23). Such is a reasonable fee to be
awarded plaintiffs on this appeal, whether fixed by
the Supreme Court, or after remittitur, by the District Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly directed a verdict on
both the liability of the Skeens and the validity of
the lien. The jury determined the amounts under
proper instructions. This court should affirm the
judgment on the verdict and indicate the disposition
of the attorney's fee question.
Respectfully submitted,
Allen M. Swan
Attorney for Plaintiffs
428 American Oil Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

